Arbeitsbereich Geschichtsdidaktik / History Education, Universität Hamburg

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Vortrag auf Konferenz zum Geschichtslernen in Maceió (Alagoas, Brasilien)

04. August 2022 Andreas Körber Keine Kommentare

Kör­ber, Andre­as (30.7.2022): “Gra­du­al Ela­bo­ra­ti­on of His­to­ri­cal Thin­king as Histo­ry Edu­ca­ti­on Times of Deni­al.” Key-Note-Vor­trag auf der Kon­fe­renz “XXI Con­gres­so Inter­na­cio­nal das Jor­na­das de Edu­ca­ção His­tó­ri­ca /​ VI Con­gres­so Ibe­ro­ame­ri­ca­no /​ IV Seminá­rio Nacio­nal de Ensi­no de His­tó­ria — UFAL ‘Edu­ca­ção His­tó­ri­ca em tem­pos de nega­cio­nis­mos e pan­de­mi­as: teo­ri­as, prá­ti­cas e pes­qui­sas’; 27. – 30.07.2022 an der Uni­ver­sidade Federal de Alagoas in Mace­ió (Alagoas, Brasilien).

Vortrag zum Verhältnis von Wissen und Kompetenzen beim Historischen Lernen

27. April 2021 Andreas Körber Keine Kommentare

Am 5. Mai wer­de ich im Rah­men der von Roland Bern­hard (Wien) und Jon Nichol (Exe­ter) orga­ni­sier­ten Vor­trags­se­rie “HEIRNET Key­notes”  des “Histo­ry Edu­ca­ti­on Inter­na­tio­nal Rese­arch Net­work HEIRNET)” einen Online-Vor­trag hal­ten zum The­ma “Know­ledge and/​or/​in Com­pe­ten­ci­es of His­to­ri­cal Thin­king? A Ger­man Per­spec­ti­ve”.

Der Vor­trag fin­det als ZOOM-Sit­zung statt und wird spä­ter auf dem You­tube-Kanal der HEIR­NET-Key­notes ver­füg­bar sein.

  • 1
  • 2 – 3
.

Die nächs­te HEIRNET Key­note wird statt­fin­den am 2.6.2021.

Die Vor­trä­ge der Rei­he sind bisher:

  1. Chap­man, Arthur (UCL Lon­don): “Power­ful Know­ledge in Histo­ry Edu­ca­ti­on”. HEIRNET Key­notes, 3/​3/​2021. https://​www​.you​tube​.com/​w​a​t​c​h​?​v​=​V​q​f​W​u​x​9​U​dnw.
  2. van Box­t­el, Car­la (Uni­ver­sit­eit Ams­ter­dam): “His­to­ri­cal know­ledge as a resour­ce for under­stan­ding past, pre­sent and future”. HEIRNET Key­notes, 4/​7/​2021. https://​www​.you​tube​.com/​w​a​t​c​h​?​v​=​W​t​n​P​d​H​C​n​ipE.
  3. Kör­ber, Andre­as (Ham­burg): Know­ledge and/​or/​in Com­pe­ten­ci­es of His­to­ri­cal Thin­king? A Ger­man Per­spec­ti­ve. HEIRNET Key­notes. HEIRNET, 5/​5/​2021. https://​www​.you​tube​.com/​c​h​a​n​n​e​l​/​U​C​7​e​W​J​u​W​G​e​Z​V​f​w​1​S​6​2​y​9​U​qfQ (Video in Vorbereitung).

Analyzing Monuments using crosstabulations of Historical Thinking Competencies and Types of Narrating

16. Oktober 2018 Andreas Körber Keine Kommentare

This arti­cle is a fol­low-up to the dis­cus­sion on Sté­pha­ne Léves­ques model of his­to­ri­cal com­pe­ten­ci­es as pre­sen­ted in Public Histo­ry Wee­kly, a few days ago, tit­led “Remo­ving the ‘Past’: Deba­tes Over Offi­cial Sites of Memo­ry“1 and my first exten­ded com­ment on this publis­hed here on this blog.

A cross­ta­bu­la­ti­on of com­pe­ten­ci­es and patterns/​logic of sen­se­ma­king as sug­gested by Sté­pha­ne Léves­que2 is inde­ed use­ful for “rea­ding” indi­vi­du­al monu­ments and making sen­se of their “mes­sa­ge”, also. Lévesque’s fil­ling of the table is a bit abs­tract, gene­ral for this, so the fol­lowing would in part be my own understanding.

It also is based on Rüsen’s noti­on that while the dif­fe­rent pat­terns were deve­lo­ped sequen­ti­al­ly over time, to “older” ones are not lost, but still avail­ab­le and inde­ed visi­ble in modern day thin­king, in fact most of the time in com­bi­na­ti­ons. What cha­rac­te­ri­zes modern-time his­to­ri­cal thin­king, then, is the pre­sence and domi­nan­ce of “gene­tic” thin­king, while pre-modern thought would not have this type at its dis­po­sal at all. But then, our examp­les here are all “modern”, so that it may be a ques­ti­on of domi­nan­ce and rela­ti­ve weight.

Take a monu­ment for a civil war general:

  • A spec­ta­tor today may read it as a remin­der to the ori­gin of the cur­rent sta­te of affairs, pos­si­b­ly the “losing of the cau­se” (e.g. both the hono­u­red gene­ral and the spec­ta­tor being sou­the­ners) or to the libe­ra­ti­on of the slaves (both nort­he­ners). In both cases, the monu­ment would be seen as poin­ting to an ori­gin of what is seen as valid today (the very defi­ni­ti­on of Rüsen’s “tra­di­tio­nal” type). This might exp­lain why peop­le adhe­ring to the nort­hern nar­ra­ti­ve would oppo­se to sou­thern monu­ments, and vice ver­sa, not believeing their sto­ry in the first place — and may­be fea­ring that kee­ping the monu­ments would signi­fy that their ver­si­on was to be seen as valid.
  • In an exem­pla­ric mode, howe­ver, both may accept the “other side’s” monu­ments, becau­se what they point at would not be seen as the ori­gin of affairs, but rather a gene­ral rule, e.g. hono­u­ring peop­le “bra­vely figh­t­ing for their respec­ti­ve (!) cau­se”. The logic would be that each socie­ty would honor “their heroes”, who do not so much stand for the spe­ci­fic cau­se but for a gene­ral rule. What hap­pens on the ground in Get­tys­burg, e.g., is some­thing along this line: “Tra­di­tio­nal” com­me­mo­ra­ting attracts most peop­le going the­re, but an exem­pla­ry “cover-nar­ra­ti­ve” allows for com­mon remembrance.

Con­si­der an examp­le from Ham­burg, whe­re I work3: On our “Rat­haus­markt”, the­re is a monu­ment, hono­u­ring Hamburg’s dead from WW1. When it was erec­ted in 1932, it loo­ked as it does today. The inscrip­ti­on on one side reads “FOURTY THOUSAND SONS OF TOWN LEFT/​LOST THEIR LIVES FOR YOU” (in Ger­man: “Vier­zig Tau­send Söh­ne der Stadt lie­ßen ihr Leben für Euch”) while the other side shows reli­ef by Ernst Bar­lach depic­ting a woman (mother) and child (daugh­ter) appar­ent­ly com­for­ting each other in mour­ning (and the­re­fo­re some­what remi­nis­cent of a pie­tà).

Ernst Barlach: Relief (1931; Re-construction) auf dem Mahnmal auf dem Hamburger Rathausmarkt. Foto von Wikimedia Commons (gemeinfrei): https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Hamburg_Mahnmal_01_KMJ-adj.jpg

Ernst Bar­lach: Reli­ef (1931; Re-Con­struc­tion of 1948) on Ham­burg Town Hall Squa­re Monu­ment . Pho­to from Wiki­me­dia Com­mons (public domain): https://​upload​.wiki​me​dia​.org/​w​i​k​i​p​e​d​i​a​/​c​o​m​m​o​n​s​/​2​/​2​c​/​H​a​m​b​u​r​g​_​M​a​h​n​m​a​l​_​0​1​_​K​M​J​-​a​d​j​.​jpg

In 1938, the reli­ef was exch­an­ged for a “phoe­nix” fly­ing up.4 

Hans-Mar­tin Ruwoldt (1938): Phoe­nix on Ham­burg Town Hall Squa­re Monu­ment. Pho­to by https://​www​.denk​-mal​-gegen​-krieg​.de/​k​r​i​e​g​e​r​d​e​n​k​m​a​e​l​e​r​/​h​a​m​b​u​r​g​-​l​o​-​os/

In 1938, under Nazi rule, the reli­ef was exch­an­ged for a „phoe­nix“. Did it chan­ge the nar­ra­ti­ve and com­me­mo­ra­ti­ve eva­lua­ti­on of the loss of the 40000 Ham­bur­gi­ans? To my view, it most cer­tain­ly did.

The addi­ti­on of the last part “FOR YOU” to the inscrip­ti­on alrea­dy befo­re the initi­al instal­la­ti­on of the monu­ment was a con­ces­si­on to the right par­ties, chan­ging (in Rüsen‘s terms) a more tra­di­tio­nal mes­sa­ge into a more exem­pla­ry one:

While the com­bi­na­ti­on of the initi­al wor­d­ing without the addi­ti­on „FOR YOU“ and the mother-child-reli­ef fit into a deve­lo­p­ment of monu­ment cul­tu­re deve­lo­ped in WW1 which has been iden­ti­fied in retro­spect, name­ly monu­ments which which do no lon­ger pro­vi­de an aut­ho­ri­ta­ti­ve sug­ges­ti­on of the mea­ning of the protagonist‘s death, but rather ques­ti­on this mea­ning.5 It did so becau­se it expres­sed the con­ti­nuous loss, refer­ring to the dead sol­di­ers rather as vic­tims of a grea­ter con­text of war, to be mour­ned, by poin­ting to their their death and loss as the rather tra­gic ori­gins of the com­mon grief.

Adding „FOR YOU“ to the inscrip­ti­on did not ful­ly era­di­ca­te this nega­ti­ve-tra­di­tio­nal nar­ra­ti­ve pat­tern, but added an addi­tio­nal lay­er of dif­fe­rent nar­ra­ti­ve and eva­lua­ti­ve cha­rac­ter both to the deaths, which are ascri­bed a pur­po­se, and to the con­cep­tu­al framing of the dead, which are no lon­ger only vic­tims but also (self-)sacrifices for a com­mon good. Inte­res­tin­g­ly, both con­cepts, that of vic­tim and that of sacri­fice, are pre­sent in the Ger­man term „Opfer“ expli­ci­tly used, but allu­ded to, here.

The exchan­ge of the mour­ning mother/child-reli­ef by a „phoe­nix“ in 1938, then, era­di­ca­ted the thin lay­er of ques­tio­ning the pur­po­se and mea­ning of the loss, the noti­on of „vic­tims“ and ren­de­red the 40,000 Fathers, Bro­thers and „Sons of Town“ heroes – not only self-sacri­fices for the well­being of their respec­ti­ve fami­lies, but role-models to be cele­bra­ted and emu­la­ted.6 In 1948, then, the lost Bar­lach-reli­ef, was res­to­red, alas not by Bar­lach hims­elf, who had mean­while died.

I do have a hard time con­struc­ting a gene­tic under­stan­ding of such a monu­ment, may­be becau­se a modern, gene­tic way of thin­king needs to have been infor­med by the “cri­ti­cal” mode of at least part­ly de-legi­ti­mi­zing the ori­en­ta­ting power of tra­di­tio­nal and exem­pla­ric thinking.

May­be this is the back­ground for modern monu­ments being qui­te dif­fe­rent, eit­her often non-figu­ra­ti­ve — as Peter Eisenman’s Memo­ri­al to the Mur­de­red Jews in Ber­lin, or many works by Jochen Gerz7 — or taking on forms of coun­ter-memo­ria­liz­a­ti­on8, thus set­ting in moti­on a kind of chan­ge, not just re-pre­sent-ing a past, but encou­ra­ging or even enfor­cing cri­ti­cal reflec­tion on it.

It is easier for the Ham­burg monu­ment: Gene­tic thin­king would ques­ti­on whe­ther not only this heroi­fy­ing way of com­me­mo­ra­ting heroes (even if not indi­vi­du­al), but also the con­cre­te form of public ack­now­led­ging of tra­gic loss can be time­ly, after we expe­ri­en­ced ano­t­her war and an inhu­man dic­ta­tor­s­hip and geno­ci­de which was not least based on fee­lings ins­ti­ga­ted by such com­me­mo­ra­ting.9

But the­re is some­thing more to reflec­ting about nar­ra­ti­ves — and espe­cial­ly on how to rela­te to them. As I wro­te abo­ve, Memo­ri­als are nar­ra­ti­ves. Rüsen calls them “nar­ra­ti­ve abbre­via­ti­ons”, poin­ting to them stan­ding for a spe­ci­fic nar­ra­ti­ve, i.e. a spe­ci­fic rela­ti­on bet­ween a past (under memo­ry), the pre­sent (of the aut­hors and erec­tors of the monu­ment as well as the inten­ded public), and with regard to a spe­ci­fic future, con­struc­ted only part­ly in ver­bal nar­ra­ti­ve form, but also with non-ver­bal and sequen­ti­al­ly nar­ra­ti­ve ele­ments (even though in some cases it is only the ver­bal inscrip­ti­ons which real­ly hint to any his­to­ri­cal meaning).

Memo­ri­als are more than only pro­to-nar­ra­ti­ves. Their (often) pro­mi­nent (albeit also often over­loo­ked) posi­tio­ning, their (proto-)narrative struc­tu­re and their own qua­li­ty for las­ting a long time (cf. “monu­men­tum exegi aere peren­ni­us), they do not only con­sti­tu­te a nar­ra­ti­ve rela­ti­on from one tem­po­ral and social posi­ti­on towrds the past and the future, but also are meant to pro­long the sen­se they make and to impo­se it on later genera­ti­ons. Monu­ments are about obli­ga­ting their audi­ence, the spec­ta­tors with a cer­tain nar­ra­ti­ve and inter­pre­ta­ti­on. That qua­li­fies them as parts of what we call “poli­tics of histo­ry”, not only of com­me­mo­ra­ti­on, and what makes them political.

It the­re­fo­re is para­mount to read monu­ments as nar­ra­ti­ves, and not only in the de-con­struc­ti­ve sen­se of “what did tho­se erec­tors make of that past back then”, but also in the re-conct­ruc­ti­ve sen­se of “in how far or how does this nar­ra­ti­ve fit into my/​our rela­ti­on to that past). In other words: Stan­ding befo­re a monu­ment and thin­king about monu­ments, we all need to (and in fact do) think in a com­bi­na­ti­on of under­stan­ding the others’ and deli­be­ra­ting our own nar­ra­ti­ve mea­ning-making.
The­re­fo­re we need to read them as nar­ra­ti­ves first, and beco­me com­pe­tent for it.

Monu­ments often take on the form of addres­sing peop­le. Some­ti­mes — as in the Ham­burg case abo­ve — they address the spec­ta­tor, remin­ding them of some kind of obli­ga­ti­on to com­me­mo­ra­te.10 But who is tal­king to whom? If the sena­te of Ham­burg tal­kes to that to the Ham­burg citi­zens of 1930 – 1932, can/​will we accept that (a) the Ham­burg Sena­te of today still admo­nis­hes us like that, and b) that we Ham­burg citi­zens of today are still addres­sed in the same way?

In other cases, (inscrip­ti­ons in) memo­ri­als might expli­ci­tly address the com­me­mo­ra­ted them­sel­ves, as e.g. in the con­fe­de­r­a­te monu­ment in Yan­cey­vil­le, N.C., who­se plaque reads “To the Sons of Cas­well Coun­ty who ser­ved in the War of 1861 – 1865 in ans­wer to the Call of their Coun­ty”, and con­ti­nues in a “We-Voice”, signed by the Cas­well Chap­ter of the United Daugh­ters of the Con­fe­der­a­cy”. So far so con­ven­tio­nal. This might be rather unpro­ble­ma­tic, sin­ce spea­ker-posi­ti­on and addres­sees are clear­ly mar­ked. One might lea­ve the monu­ment even if one dis­agreed, not having to align with its nar­ra­ti­ve. Only if the pre­sence of such com­me­mo­ra­ting in its­elf is inac­cep­ta­ble, action is immedia­te­ly cal­led for.

But the­re are other monu­ments which seem to talk from a neu­tral posi­ti­on, which in fact is that of the erec­tors, but by not being qua­li­fied, inclu­des the spec­ta­tor into the spea­ker posi­ti­on. The examp­le I have rea­dy at hand, is not from the US and not about war heroes, but again from Ham­burg, this time from Neu­en­gam­me con­cen­tra­ti­on camp memo­ri­al. In 1965, an “inter­na­tio­nal monu­ment” ste­le11 was erec­ted the­re, tog­e­ther with a who­le seri­es of coun­try-spe­ci­fic memo­ri­al pla­tes. The inscrip­ti­on on the monu­ment reads “Your suf­fe­ring, your figh­t­ing and your death shall not be in vain” (my trans­la­ti­on).
This now clear­ly is inte­res­ting in at least two respects: (1) it ascri­bes not only suf­fe­ring and death, but also figh­t­ing to tho­se com­me­mo­ra­ted and ther­eby pos­si­b­ly does not refer to tho­se inma­tes who never had a chan­ce or did not “fight”, who were pure vic­tims, and (2) it speaks from a neu­tral voice which is not mar­ked in time and social, poli­ti­cal or event-rela­ted posi­ti­on. Whoever mourns at that place pos­si­b­ly silent­ly co-signs the statement.

International Monument (1965) at Neuengamme Concentration Camp Memorial (partial photo; (c) 2006 Andreas Körber)

Inter­na­tio­nal Monu­ment (1965) at Neu­en­gam­me Con­cen­tra­ti­on Camp Memo­ri­al (par­ti­al pho­to; © 2006 Andre­as Körber)

Con­si­der an equal hono­u­ring of con­fe­de­r­a­te gene­rals in, say NC: “Your figh­t­ing shall not have been in vain.” I would spark much more con­tro­ver­sy and con­cers — and right­ly so.

Still ano­t­her examp­le, the first Ham­burg monu­ment for the vic­tims of Natio­nal Socia­lism (from late 1945) on the Cen­tral Ceme­try in Ham­burg-Ohls­dorf, has an inscrip­ti­on “Injus­ti­ce brought Us Death — Living: Reco­gni­ze your Obligation”.

Erstes Hamburger Mahnmal für die Opfer des Nationalsozialismus von 11/1945 in Hamburg Ohlsdorf. Foto von NordNordWest/Wikipedia. Lizenz: CC-BY-SA 3.0; (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/legalcode); Original: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mahnmal_Opfer_der_NS-Verfolgung_Ohlsdorf.jpg

Ers­tes Ham­bur­ger Mahn­mal für die Opfer des Natio­nal­so­zia­lis­mus von 11/​1945 in Ham­burg Ohls­dorf. Foto von NordNordWest/​Wikipedia. Lizenz: CC-BY-SA 3.0; (https://​crea​ti​vecom​mons​.org/​l​i​c​e​n​s​e​s​/​b​y​-​s​a​/​3​.​0​/​d​e​/​l​e​g​a​l​c​ode); Ori­gi­nal: http://​com​mons​.wiki​me​dia​.org/​w​i​k​i​/​F​i​l​e​:​M​a​h​n​m​a​l​_​O​p​f​e​r​_​d​e​r​_​N​S​-​V​e​r​f​o​l​g​u​n​g​_​O​h​l​s​d​o​r​f​.​jpg

 

Erstes Hamburger Mahnmal für die Opfer des Nationalsozialismus von 11/1945 in Hamburg Ohlsdorf; Detail. Zustand 25.3.2010; Foto (c) Andreas Körber

Ers­tes Ham­bur­ger Mahn­mal für die Opfer des Natio­nal­so­zia­lis­mus von 11/​1945 in Ham­burg Ohls­dorf; Detail. Zustand 25.3.2010; Foto © Andre­as Körber

 

Again, for ana­ly­zing and under­stan­ding, we need to reco­gni­ze. The spea­ker posi­ti­on here, is clear­ly (meta­pho­ri­call) held by the vic­tims to be com­me­mo­ra­ted. But whom do they speak to? Liter­al­ly, it is the “living”. In a very broad under­stan­ding, the monument/​memorial the­re­fo­re addres­ses all humans, qui­te in a way what Rüsen has addres­sed as the hig­hest level of nor­ma­ti­ve plau­si­bi­li­ty: broa­de­ning the per­spec­ti­ve to the level of huma­ni­ty.
This is not very pro­ble­ma­tic, sin­ce the inscrip­ti­on does talk of “duty”, not of “guilt”, it does not con­fla­te the addres­sees with tho­se who inflic­ted the injus­ti­ce upon the vic­tims. But it could have done. In 1945, the mes­sa­ge would be clear­ly not merely uni­ver­sal­ly huma­nistic, but at least also addres­sing the Ger­mans as the socie­ty of the per­pe­tra­tors. It does not con­demn, but calls for reco­gni­zing the “duty” and respon­si­bi­li­ty for com­me­mo­ra­ting and non-repea­ting as well as over­co­m­ing the struc­tures of NS injus­ti­ce, hin­ting at respon­si­bi­li­ty for not pre­ven­ting them or even par­ti­ci­pa­ting in them in the first place.

And today? In how far is the mes­sa­ge the same for today’s socie­ty in Ger­ma­ny? The peop­le living in Ger­ma­ny today do — apart from very few excep­ti­ons — not share any per­so­nal guilt or respon­si­bi­li­ty for what hap­pen­ed. In how far can or should they see them­sel­ves addressed?

Again, the­re is no ques­ti­on as to the very gene­ral, huma­ni­ty-rela­ted address. This is direc­ted at any audi­ence. But would that mean that the­re is no dif­fe­rence bet­ween any other visi­tor to the memo­ri­al and Ger­mans? Has the Nazi injus­ti­ce (and simi­lar­ly the Holo­caust) beco­me a mat­ter of gene­ral, uni­ver­sal histo­ry only? Is the­re no spe­cial belon­ging to and mes­sa­ge for Ger­man histo­ry? All the­se ques­ti­ons can and need to be addres­sed — and espe­cial­ly so, sin­ce a con­si­derable part of Ger­man socie­ty con­sists not only of peop­le born and rai­sed (long) after the “Third Reich”, but also of many who immi­gra­ted from other coun­tries, socie­ties and cul­tures mean­while. Are they sim­ply coun­ted into the per­pe­tra­tors’ socie­ty? — no, I think; but as peop­le living in Ger­ma­ny, they also are adres­sed in a more spe­ci­fic way than any other visi­tor — and they are expec­ted to feel addres­sed, also. While the­re may be (and often inde­ed is) not spe­ci­fic respon­si­bi­li­ty for what the­se memo­ri­als and monu­ments refer to, the­re surely is a spe­ci­fic respon­si­bi­li­ty from or out of this histo­ry — and the­se monu­ments the­re­fo­re ser­ve not only as gene­ral mar­kers to a set past, but also as marks which have spe­ci­fic messages and dif­fe­rent (but com­pa­ti­ble) ones for dif­fe­rent reci­pi­ents. This is what also is a part of what is nee­ded to be reflec­ted and dis­cus­sed with regard to monu­ments in public histo­ry cul­tu­re and what histo­ry edu­ca­ti­on needs to enab­le lear­ners to par­ta­ke in.

In order to make up our minds on monu­ments we have “inheri­ted” not only in poli­ti­cal terms, we need to reflect their spe­ci­fic nar­ra­ti­ve mes­sa­ge in a spec­trum of time-rela­ti­ons. And we need to dif­fe­ren­tia­te our ter­mi­no­lo­gy and enab­le our stu­dents to mas­ter a set of con­cepts rela­ted. We need, e.g., to dis­tin­guish hono­ring forms of com­me­mo­ra­ti­on from remin­ding and admo­nis­hing ones.

In Ger­ma­ny we have (not eas­liy) deve­lo­ped the noti­on of “Mahn­mal”, admo­nis­hing, to be dis­tin­guis­hed from a mere “Denk­mal” (liter­al­ly a “thin­king mark”). But even this dis­tinc­tion is insuf­fi­ci­ent. A Mahn­mal (in fact the lite­ral trans­la­ti­on to “monu­ment”, from Latin “admone­re”) may admo­nish to remem­ber our own suf­fe­ring inflic­ted on us by our­sel­ves, some tra­gic or by others, but also may admo­nish to not for­get what we inflic­ted on others. This is the spe­ci­fic form “nega­ti­ve memo­ry” of Ger­man memo­ri­al culture.

 

The­re­fo­re, there’s a lot more to be reflec­ted in commemorating:

  • Who “talks”? who aut­hors the nar­ra­ti­ve — and is what capa­ci­ty (e.g. in lieuf of “the peop­le”, of a cer­tain group, …)?
  • whom does the monu­ment expli­ci­ty address?
  • what is the rela­ti­on of expli­cit addres­sees and fac­tu­al spectators?
  • in how far is the mes­sa­ge the same for us today as it was envi­sio­ned back then — and pos­si­b­ly rea­li­zed? is it the same for all of us?
  • what kind of mes­sa­ge is perceived?

(cf. Kör­ber 2014)

 

Refe­ren­ces:

  • Has­berg, Wolf­gang (2012): Ana­ly­ti­sche Wege zu bes­se­rem Geschichts­un­ter­richt. His­to­ri­sches Den­ken im Hand­lungs­zu­sam­men­hang Geschichts­un­ter­richt. In: Mey­er-Ham­me, Johan­nes /​ Thü­ne­mann, Hol­ger /​ Züls­dorf-Kers­t­ing, Meik (Hrsg.): Was heißt guter Geschichts­un­ter­richt? Per­spek­ti­ven im Ver­gleich. Schwalbach/​Ts. /​ Wochen­schau, S. 137 – 160, p. 140.
  • Klin­gel, Kers­tin (2006): Eichen­kranz und Dor­nen­kro­ne. Krie­ger­denk­mä­ler in Ham­burg. Ham­burg: Lan­des­zen­tra­le für Poli­ti­sche Bildung.
  • Kör­ber, Andre­as (2014): De-Con­struc­ting Memo­ry Cul­tu­re. In: Tea­ching his­to­ri­cal memo­ries in an inter­cul­tu­ral per­spec­ti­ve. Con­cepts and methods : expe­ri­en­ces and results from the Tea­c­Mem pro­ject. Hrsg. von Hel­le Bje­rg, Andre­as Kör­ber, Clau­dia Lenz u. Oli­ver von Wro­chem. Ber­lin 2014, 145 – 151.
  • Kör­ber, Andre­as (2016): Sinn­bil­dungs­ty­pen als Gra­du­ie­run­gen? Ver­such einer Klä­rung am Bei­spiel der His­to­ri­schen Fra­ge­kom­pe­tenz. In: Kat­ja Leh­mann, Micha­el Wer­ner und Ste­fa­nie Zabold (Hg.): His­to­ri­sches Den­ken jetzt und in Zukunft. Wege zu einem theo­re­tisch fun­dier­ten und evi­denz­ba­sier­ten Umgang mit Geschich­te. Fest­schrift für Wal­traud Schrei­ber zum 60. Geburts­tag. Ber­lin, Müns­ter: Lit Ver­lag (Geschichts­di­dak­tik in Ver­gan­gen­heit und Gegen­wart, 10), S. 27 – 41.
  • Rüsen, Jörn (2017): Evi­dence and Mea­ning. A Theo­ry of His­to­ri­cal Stu­dies. Unter Mit­ar­beit von Dia­ne Kerns und Kat­ie Digan. New York, NY: Berg­hahn Books Incor­po­ra­ted (Making Sen­se of Histo­ry Ser, v.28).
Anmer­kun­gen /​ Refe­ren­ces
  1.   Léves­que, Sté­pha­ne: Remo­ving the “Past”: Deba­tes Over Offi­cial Sites of Memo­ry. In: Public Histo­ry Wee­kly 6 (2018) 29, DOI: dx​.doi​.org/​1​0​.​1​5​1​5​/​p​h​w​-​2​018 – 12570. The­re also is a Ger­man and a French ver­si­on. []
  2. Ano­t­her such cross­ta­bu­la­ti­on has been sug­gested (in Ger­man) by Wolf­gang Has­berg (Ana­ly­ti­sche Wege zu bes­se­rem Geschichts­un­ter­richt. His­to­ri­sches Den­ken im Hand­lungs­zu­sam­men­hang Geschichts­un­ter­richt. In: Mey­er-Ham­me, Johan­nes /​ Thü­ne­mann, Hol­ger /​ Züls­dorf-Kers­t­ing, Meik (Hrsg.): Was heißt guter Geschichts­un­ter­richt? Per­spek­ti­ven im Ver­gleich. Schwalbach/​Ts. /​ Wochen­schau, S. 137 – 160, p. 140). For my cri­tique see Kör­ber 2016 (in Ger­man). I also pro­vi­ded a table, inclu­ding the dif­fe­rent niveaus, but restric­ted to “Fra­ge­kom­pe­tenz” (simi­lar to Lévesque’s “inqui­ry com­pe­tence”). []
  3. I used this also in a twit­ter-dis­cus­sion with Kim Wag­ner (@KimAtiWagner) recent­ly. []
  4. For more pic­tures and infor­ma­ti­on see also https://​www​.denk​-mal​-gegen​-krieg​.de/​k​r​i​e​g​e​r​d​e​n​k​m​a​e​l​e​r​/​h​a​m​b​u​r​g​-​l​o​-​os/. []
  5. On this type of monu­ments cf. Kosel­leck, Rein­hart (1994): Ein­lei­tung. In: Rein­hart Kosel­leck und Micha­el Jeis­mann (Hg.): Der poli­ti­sche Toten­kult. Krie­ger­denk­mä­ler in der Moder­ne. Mün­chen: Fink (Bild und Text), S. 9 – 20, here p. 18f. []
  6. Accord­ing to Klin­gel, Kers­tin (2006): Eichen­kranz und Dor­nen­kro­ne. Krie­ger­denk­mä­ler in Ham­burg. Ham­burg: Lan­des­zen­tra­le für Poli­ti­sche Bil­dung, p.71, the mour­ning-reli­ef initi­al­ly was to be repla­ced by “war sym­bols” but all skte­ches han­ded in by artists (inclu­ding a wrath with swords by Ruwoldt) were rejec­ted, so that he was com­mis­sio­ned to crea­te an eagle, which he did, but in a way which far more resem­bled a dove than an eagle. In how far this can be inter­pre­ted as a sub­ver­si­ve rejec­tion of the new mar­ti­al cha­rac­ter and even be eva­lua­ted as an act of defi­an­ce, is high­ly ques­tion­ab­le, sin­ce the sym­bo­lism of the dove as the uni­ver­si­al sym­bol for peace was crea­ted by Picas­so only after World­War II. []
  7. Cf. e.g. his “Invi­si­ble Monu­ment” in Sar­brü­cken: https://​en​.wiki​pe​dia​.org/​w​i​k​i​/​P​l​a​t​z​_​d​e​s​_​U​n​s​i​c​h​t​b​a​r​e​n​_​M​a​h​n​m​als. []
  8. Cf. a.o. Wij­sen­beek, Dinah: Denk­mal und Gegen­denk­mal. Über den kri­ti­schen Umgang mit der Ver­gan­gen­heit auf dem Gebiet der bil­den­den Kunst. Mün­chen 2010. []
  9. There’s a lot more to be reflec­ted in com­me­mo­ra­ting: Who talks to whom, here? What do they say and expect? Who is the “you”? Is it ” us” — still today? And if so: in how far is the mes­sa­ge the same for all of us, tho­se with Ham­burg ances­tors of the time, and tho­se without, may­be immi­grants? In how far can this aspect defi­ne our atti­tu­de? Can we for­ce all recent immi­grants into our own “natio­nal” nar­ra­ti­ve (and even more so when it is not WW1, but Holo­caust rela­ted)? But then, how can we not? (cf. also Kör­ber 2014, and see below. []
  10. My mother used to exp­lain the Ger­man word “Denk­mal”, liter­al­ly referr­ring to a “mark(er)” for initia­ting thin­king, as an impe­ra­ti­ve: “Denk mal!”, refer­ring to the other mea­ning of the word “mal” as “for once”, resul­ting in “do think for once!” []
  11. Cf. https://​upload​.wiki​me​dia​.org/​w​i​k​i​p​e​d​i​a​/​c​o​m​m​o​n​s​/​t​h​u​m​b​/​1​/​1​5​/​N​e​u​e​n​g​a​m​m​e​_​m​e​m​o​r​i​a​l​.​j​p​g​/​8​0​0​p​x​-​N​e​u​e​n​g​a​m​m​e​_​m​e​m​o​r​i​a​l​.​jpg, (pho­to by Hao Liu in the public domain) []
==

A new competency-model on monuments using Rüsen’s four types by Stéphane Levesque — and a comment

15. Oktober 2018 Andreas Körber Keine Kommentare

In a recent con­tri­bu­ti­on to Public Histo­ry Wee­kly, tit­led “Remo­ving the ‘Past’: Deba­tes Over Offi­cial Sites of Memo­ry” 1Sté­pha­ne Léves­que from Otta­wa, Cana­da, pre­sen­ted a new model for monu­ment-rela­ted com­pe­ten­ci­es of his­to­ri­cal thin­king, using Jörn Rüsen’s types of his­to­ri­cal narrating.

The gra­phic ver­si­on of the model con­sists of four “com­pe­ten­ces”, visua­li­zed as smal­ler cog­wheels arran­ged around and inter­ac­ting with a cen­tral cog­wheel tit­led with “his­to­ri­cal con­scious­ness”. For each of the four com­pe­ten­ci­es, a short, monu­ment-rela­ted defi­ni­ti­on is given.

Promp­ted by a com­men­ta­ry by Gabri­el Reich of Vir­gi­nia Com­mon­wealth Uni­ver­si­ty, who also works exten­si­ve­ly on monu­ments in memo­ry cul­tu­re, Sté­pha­ne Léves­que added a (more gene­ral) table ver­si­on (a Spa­nish trans­la­ti­on by Eliza­beth Mon­tana­res Var­gas has been pre­sen­ted on face­book, mean­while) in an ans­we­ring com­ment, fur­ther detail­ing the com­pe­ten­ci­es in his model. 2.

As much as I appre­cia­te this new model of com­pe­ten­ci­es in gene­ral, I have also added a few comments to it (and to one point of Gabri­el Reich’s com­ment, which is not in focus, here). The space pro­vi­ded by Public histo­ry wee­kly for com­men­ting is limi­ted and graphs are (at least not easi­ly) allo­wed. I the­re­fo­re use this my own blog for repea­ting my com­ment to Lévesque’s model, and to detail it a bit further.

First of all, I stron­gly sup­port the initia­ti­ve to ana­ly­se monu­ments as an expres­si­on of and fac­tor for his­to­ri­cal con­scious­ness. Inde­ed, we need both a) to ana­ly­se them as experts by using our reper­toire of his­to­rio­gra­phic methods and con­cepts in order to sti­mu­la­te and sup­port infor­med public dis­cus­sion about whe­ther a par­ti­cu­lar monu­ment is still desi­ra­ble (or at least accep­ta­ble) or whe­ther it needs to be chan­ged (and how) or even remo­ved, and b) to deve­lop people’s com­pe­ten­ces to address the­se issu­es them­sel­ves, i.e. to reflect on the natu­re, mea­ning and mes­sa­ge of a monu­ment both at the time of its con­struc­tion and today (e.g. through pre­ser­va­ti­on, main­ten­an­ce, alte­ra­ti­on, com­men­ting or removal).

For this rea­son, I great­ly appre­cia­te Stéphane’s pro­po­sal for a com­pe­ten­cy model, espe­cial­ly the table ver­si­on from the com­men­ta­ry abo­ve. This does not mean that I ful­ly sup­port the con­cre­te model, but it has enri­ched the deba­te. Three comments on this:

(1) I doubt that com­pe­tence as such can be “tra­di­tio­nal”, “exem­pla­ry”, “gene­tic”, “cri­ti­cal” or “gene­tic”. The­se pat­terns, both as I under­stand Rüsen and for mys­elf, cha­rac­te­ri­ze the logic of nar­ra­ti­ves. I would the­re­fo­re rather read the table as “the com­pe­tence to que­ry in the tra­di­tio­nal mode” … “the com­pe­tence to nar­ra­te in cri­ti­cal mode” etc.

(2) This again rai­ses the ques­ti­on of whe­ther the four pat­terns actual­ly con­sti­tu­te a dis­tinc­tion of com­pe­tence niveaus. While I agree that the gene­tic mode of nar­ra­ting histo­ry is the his­to­ri­cal­ly most recent, com­plex and sui­ta­ble for exp­lai­ning chan­ges, I doubt – this time against Rüsen (cf. Kör­ber 2016) – that the typo­lo­gy can descri­be com­pe­tence levels.
The com­pe­tence pro­gres­si­on would need to be defi­ned trans­ver­sal­ly: From (a) a basic level of non-dis­tinc­ti­ve (and thus uncon­scious­ly con­fu­sing) forms and pat­terns, via (b) the abi­li­ty to per­form all the­se forms of ope­ra­ti­ons in the various pat­terns of Stéphane’s table (which would this descri­be a ful­ly deve­lo­ped inter­me­dia­te level), to © an ela­bo­ra­ted level of (addi­tio­nal) abi­li­ty to think about the natu­re of the­se disc­tions, etc.

For this, the model is very use­ful, full of ide­as. It can help to think about what it takes to descri­be monu­ments neit­her as “the past” nor as “sim­ply old”, but to iden­ti­fy and “read” them as nar­ra­ti­ves (or nar­ra­ti­ve abbre­via­ti­ons) from a cer­tain time, who­se cur­rent tre­at­ment adds new nar­ra­ti­ve lay­ers to them, so that their exis­tence (or absence), form, and tre­at­ment of them can always be seen and eva­lua­ted as con­tem­pora­ry state­ments about the respec­ti­ve past. To reco­gni­ze this and to deal with it in a social­ly respon­si­ble way requi­res the­se competences.

As far as Gabri­el Reich’s com­men­ta­ry is con­cer­ned, I only ask whe­ther his cha­rac­te­riz­a­ti­on of an atti­tu­de to the con­fe­de­ra­ti­on monu­ments can real­ly be addres­sed with Rüsen as “exem­pla­ry”, sin­ce this mode is not con­cer­ned with the main­ten­an­ce and sup­port of a con­ven­tio­nal iden­ti­ty, but with the deri­va­ti­on of a super­tem­po­ral rule. I would refer to the examp­le as “tra­di­tio­nal”. An “exem­pla­ry” atti­tu­de towards reten­ti­on would be more likely to be: “At all times, monu­ments of one’s own heroes have hel­ped the losers of war to hold on to their cau­se. Then that must be pos­si­ble for us too.” Or some­thing along that line.

So far the com­ment alrea­dy publis­hed in Public Histo­ry Weekly.

That said, I might add, that I don’t mean that the “gene­tic” way of sen­se­ma­king is not in some way supe­ri­or to the others, and more apt for his­to­ri­cal mea­ning-making, espe­cial­ly in its inte­gra­ti­on of a noti­on of direc­ted chan­ge over time. My scep­ti­cism focu­ses on the idea that today’s people’s (“onto­ge­ne­tic”) com­pe­ten­ci­es of his­to­ri­cal thin­king pro­gres­ses along the same line as the cul­tu­ral (“phy­lo­ge­ne­tic”) deve­lo­po­ment of Rüsen’s pat­terns of sen­se­ma­king throughout the histo­ry of his­to­rio­gra­phy. Today’s youth simul­ta­ne­ous­ly encoun­ter mani­fes­ta­ti­ons of his­to­ri­cal thin­king using all three (rather than four) 3 pat­terns of sen­se­ma­king. While the­re is a kind of “deve­lo­p­ment” of power of his­to­ri­cal mea­ning-making and explana­ti­on from tra­di­tio­nal via exem­pla­ric to gene­tic, I doubt that peop­le and stu­dents have to move from the for­mer to the lat­ter — or do so.

My own idea of deve­lo­p­ment of com­pe­ten­ci­es of his­to­ri­cal thin­king can rather be visua­li­zed as fol­lows (adop­ting Lévesque’s table):

Three niveaus/levels of competencies (schematic), following the FUER-model (cf. Körber 2015). The graph uses the table-version of Stéphane Lévesque's competence-model for historical thinking on monuments (https://public-history-weekly.degruyter.com/6-2018-29/removing-past-official-memory/; courtesy of Stéphane Lévesque by e-mail Oct 15th, 2018). A.K. 2018
Three niveaus/​levels of com­pe­ten­ci­es (sche­ma­tic), fol­lowing the FUER-model (cf. Kör­ber et al. 2007; Kör­ber 2015) 4. The graph uses the table-ver­si­on of Sté­pha­ne Lévesque’s com­pe­tence-model for his­to­ri­cal thin­king on monu­ments (https://​public​-histo​ry​-wee​kly​.degruy​ter​.com/6 – 2018-29/­re­mo­ving-past-offi­cial-memo­ry/; cour­te­sy of Sté­pha­ne Léves­que by e‑mail Oct 15th, 2018). A.K. 2018

 

  1. A “basic” niveau (and pos­si­b­ly ear­ly sta­ge) would be defi­ned by the ina­bi­li­ty of dis­tin­guis­hing dif­fe­rent modes of his­to­ri­cal nar­ra­ting in gene­ral and refer­ring to monu­ments in this spe­ci­fic case. (Young) peop­le on this niveau (at this sta­ge) will rela­te to them. They will ask ques­ti­ons (and thus exer­cise their “inqui­ry com­pe­tence”), think (“his­to­ri­cal thin­king com­pe­tence”), ori­en­ta­te them­sel­ves (“ori­en­ta­ti­on com­pe­tence”), and nar­ra­te (“nar­ra­ti­ve com­pe­tence”). But this basic niveau will not be defi­ned by being “tra­di­tio­nal”, but by an unin­for­med mixing (pos­si­b­ly only half-unders­tood) forms of all three pat­terns. This per­for­mance will be both ins­ta­ble and incon­sis­tent. Half-baked tra­di­tio­nal ques­ti­ons will stand next to unre­flec­ted exem­pla­ry state­ments, and so on. In the graph abo­ve, this is sym­bo­li­zed by the blur­red table below.
  2. The abi­li­ty to app­ly the dif­fe­rent pat­terns in a some­what cla­ri­fied way, to dis­tin­guish them and select one, to iden­ti­fy incon­sis­ten­ci­es in their mixing, etc., then marks the inter­me­di­a­ry niveau, and pos­si­ble a major sta­ge in the deve­lo­p­ment of the­se com­pe­ten­ci­es. On this niveau, at this sta­ge, peop­le will be able to dis­cuss about the mes­sa­ge a monu­ment expres­ses and the mea­ning it has for us today, but they might dis­agree and even quar­rel becau­se they app­ly dif­fe­rent pat­terns of mea­ning-making.
    In a way, Lévesque’s table descri­bes this inter­me­dia­te niveau, the dif­fe­rent forms of his­to­ri­cal inqui­ring, thin­king, ori­en­ta­ting, and nar­ra­ting can take, depen­ding from the gene­ral pat­tern of sen­se­ma­king. The table (the midd­le one in the graph abo­ve) clear­ly points at some­thing, I have also tried to express in my Ger­man arti­cle chal­len­ging Rüsen’s own idea of the dif­fe­rent pat­terns forming dif­fe­rent nivue­aus of com­pe­ten­ci­es 5: Each of the dif­fe­rent ope­ra­ti­ons (inqui­ring, nar­ra­ting, ori­en­ta­ting) will take on a spe­ci­fic stance of nar­ra­ting. It is a dif­fe­rence whe­ther I ask for a tra­di­ti­on or for a rule to be deri­ved from past examp­les, or about a pat­terns of chan­ge across time. The­se ques­ti­ons are infor­med by more gene­ral stan­ces and under­stan­dings of histo­ry (may­be coded in Lévesque’s cen­tral cog­wheel of “his­to­ri­cal con­scious­ness”) and will gene­ra­te dif­fe­rent forms of ori­en­ta­ti­on and nar­ra­ting. This does not mean that the initi­al stance deter­mi­nes the out­co­me of the sto­ry, ren­de­ring his­to­ri­cal thin­king a mat­ter of self-affir­ma­ti­on — not at all. A per­son inqui­ring in tra­di­tio­nal will look for an ori­gin for some­thing valid and might — via his­to­ri­cal thin­king and rese­arch — learn of a qui­te dif­fe­rent ori­gin. The mode of mea­ning-making will still be tra­di­tio­nal, but the con­cre­te histo­ry will have chan­ged. But peop­le might also be for­ced to chan­ge their pat­tern in the pro­cess, e.g. lear­ning of the limits of exem­pla­ry thin­king when gai­ning insight into fun­da­men­tal chan­ge, and thus “pro­gress” in a way from exem­pla­ry to gene­tic sensemaking.
  3. The hig­hest niveau, howe­ver, will be reached not by final­ly arri­ving at the gene­tic forms of thin­king and the respec­ti­ve com­pe­ten­ci­es, but by com­ple­men­ting the abi­li­ty to reco­gni­ze, dis­tin­guish and app­ly the dif­fe­rent for­ma with a trans­gres­sing abi­li­ty to reflect on the natu­re, value and limits of this (and other) typo­lo­gies them­sel­ves. Only on this niveau (at this sta­ge) are peop­le ful­ly at com­mand of their his­to­ri­cal reflec­tion. They can address the limits socie­tal­ly accep­ted con­cepts and ter­mi­no­lo­gy pose and sug­gest new or amen­ded ones, etc. In the graph abo­ve, this is sym­bo­li­zed by the addi­tio­nal focus to the rubrics of Lévesque’s table, mar­ked by the blue rings.
Anmer­kun­gen /​ Refe­ren­ces
  1.   Léves­que, Sté­pha­ne: Remo­ving the “Past”: Deba­tes Over Offi­cial Sites of Memo­ry. In: Public Histo­ry Wee­kly 6 (2018) 29, DOI: dx​.doi​.org/​1​0​.​1​5​1​5​/​p​h​w​-​2​018 – 12570. The­re also is a Ger­man and a French ver­si­on. []
  2. The table can be found under the same address as the ori­gi­nal con­tri­bu­ti­on, down the page []
  3. Rüsen’s “cri­ti­cal” type of nar­ra­ting does not real­ly fit into the typo­lo­gy, pre­sen­ting not a new logic of inter­con­nec­ting tem­po­ral infor­ma­ti­on, but merely de-elgi­ti­mi­zing others. In 1988 alrea­dy, Bodo von Bor­ries com­men­ted on this and pre­sen­ted a gra­phi­cal con­cept of the inter­re­la­ti­on of the dif­fe­rent types, in which a “cri­ti­cal” type was pla­ced bet­ween both the tra­di­tio­nal and the exem­pla­ry and the lat­ter and the gene­tic, thus assigning it the func­tion of a cata­lyst of deve­lo­p­ment (Bor­ries, Bodo von (1988): Geschichts­ler­nen und Geschichts­be­wusst­sein. Empi­ri­sche Erkun­dun­gen zu Erwerb und Gebrauch von His­to­rie. 1. Aufl. Stutt­gart: Klett, p. 61; cf.  Kör­ber, Andre­as (2015): His­to­ri­cal con­scious­ness, his­to­ri­cal com­pe­ten­ci­es – and bey­ond? Some con­cep­tu­al deve­lo­p­ment wit­hin Ger­man histo­ry didac­tics. Online ver­füg­bar unter http://​www​.pedocs​.de/​v​o​l​l​t​e​x​t​e​/​2​0​1​5​/​1​0​8​1​1​/​p​d​f​/​K​o​e​r​b​e​r​_​2​0​1​5​_​D​e​v​e​l​o​p​m​e​n​t​_​G​e​r​m​a​n​_​H​i​s​t​o​r​y​_​D​i​d​a​c​t​i​c​s​.​pdf, p. 14f.). In the new ver­si­on of his “His­to­rik”, Rüsen pres­ents a simi­lar ver­si­on. Cf. Rüsen, Jörn (2013): His­to­rik. Theo­rie der Geschichts­wis­sen­schaft. Köln: Böhlau, p. 260. Eng­lish: Rüsen, Jörn (2017): Evi­dence and Mea­ning. A Theo­ry of His­to­ri­cal Stu­dies. Unter Mit­ar­beit von Dia­ne Kerns und Kat­ie Digan. New York, NY: Berg­hahn Books Incor­po­ra­ted (Making Sen­se of Histo­ry Ser, v.28), p. 198. []
  4.  Schrei­ber, Wal­traud; Kör­ber, Andre­as; Bor­ries, Bodo von; Kram­mer, Rein­hard; Leut­ner-Ram­me, Sibyl­la; Mebus, Syl­via et al. (2007): His­to­ri­sches Den­ken. Ein Kom­pe­tenz-Struk­tur­mo­dell (Basis­bei­trag). In: Andre­as Kör­ber, Wal­traud Schrei­ber und Alex­an­der Schö­ner (Hg.): Kom­pe­ten­zen his­to­ri­schen Den­kens. Ein Struk­tur­mo­dell als Bei­trag zur Kom­pe­tenz­ori­en­tie­rung in der Geschichts­di­dak­tik. Neu­ried: Ars Una Ver­lags-Gesell­schaft (Kom­pe­ten­zen, 2), S. 17 – 53; Kör­ber, Andre­as (2012): Gra­du­ie­rung his­to­ri­scher Kom­pe­ten­zen. In: Miche­le Bar­ri­cel­li und Mar­tin Lücke (Hg.): Hand­buch Pra­xis des Geschichts­un­ter­richts. His­to­ri­sches Ler­nen in der Schu­le, Bd. 1. Schwalbach/​Ts.: Wochen­schau Ver­lag (Wochen­schau Geschich­te), S. 236 – 254.; Kör­ber, Andre­as (2015): His­to­ri­cal con­scious­ness, his­to­ri­cal com­pe­ten­ci­es – and bey­ond? Some con­cep­tu­al deve­lo­p­ment wit­hin Ger­man histo­ry didac­tics. Online ver­füg­bar unter http://​www​.pedocs​.de/​v​o​l​l​t​e​x​t​e​/​2​0​1​5​/​1​0​8​1​1​/​p​d​f​/​K​o​e​r​b​e​r​_​2​0​1​5​_​D​e​v​e​l​o​p​m​e​n​t​_​G​e​r​m​a​n​_​H​i​s​t​o​r​y​_​D​i​d​a​c​t​i​c​s​.​pdf, pp. 39ff []
  5.  Kör­ber, Andre­as (2016): Sinn­bil­dungs­ty­pen als Gra­du­ie­run­gen? Ver­such einer Klä­rung am Bei­spiel der His­to­ri­schen Fra­ge­kom­pe­tenz. In: Kat­ja Leh­mann, Micha­el Wer­ner und Ste­fa­nie Zabold (Hg.): His­to­ri­sches Den­ken jetzt und in Zukunft. Wege zu einem theo­re­tisch fun­dier­ten und evi­denz­ba­sier­ten Umgang mit Geschich­te. Fest­schrift für Wal­traud Schrei­ber zum 60. Geburts­tag. Ber­lin, Müns­ter: Lit Ver­lag (Geschichts­di­dak­tik in Ver­gan­gen­heit und Gegen­wart, 10), S. 27 – 41. []
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Vortrag zu “Living History” und Historischem Lernen in Warschau

25. Februar 2017 Andreas Körber Keine Kommentare

Am 23. und 24.2. 2017 fand im Deut­schen His­to­ri­schen  Insti­tut in War­schau eine inter­na­tio­na­le Tagung statt zum The­ma  “Step­ping Back in Time Living Histo­ry and Other Per­for­ma­ti­ve Approa­ches to Histo­ry in Cen­tral and South-Eas­tern Euro­pe.” Ich habe dort einen Vor­trag zu Fra­gen des His­to­ri­schen Ler­nens in die­sem Zusam­men­hang gehal­ten. Nach­trag 23.5.2017: Ein Tagungs­be­richt fin­det hier sich auf H‑SOZ-KULT.

Englischsprachiger Artikel zur Kompetenzorientierung des historischen Lernens

05. Januar 2010 Andreas Körber Keine Kommentare

In der Doku­men­ta­ti­on zur Tagung “His­to­ri­cis­ing the Uses of the Past” in Oslo ist eine eng­lisch­spra­chi­ge Kurz­fas­sung des FUER-Kom­pe­tenz­mo­dells erschienen:

 

Kör­ber, Andre­as (2011): “Ger­man Histo­ry Didac­tics: From His­to­ri­cal Con­scious­ness to His­to­ri­cal Com­pe­ten­ci­es – and bey­ond?” In: Bje­rg, Hel­le; Lenz, Clau­dia; Thors­ten­sen, Erik (Hgg.; 2011): His­to­ri­cis­ing the Uses of the Past – Scan­di­na­vi­an Per­spec­ti­ves on Histo­ry Cul­tu­re, His­to­ri­cal Con­scious­ness and Didac­tics of Histo­ry Rela­ted to World War II. Bie­le­feld: tran­script (Zeit – Sinn – Kul­tur); <a href=“https://portal.dnb.de/opac.htm?query=9783837613254&method=simpleSearch”>ISBN: 9783837613254</a> ; pp. 145 – 164.