„Facts“ vs. „Fictions“ – the wrong opposition

„History is the fiction we invent
to persuade ourselves
that events are knowable
and life has order and direction“
(( Watterson, Bill (2010): „Calvin and Hobbes“ 19.7.1993; In: The complete Calvin and Hobbes. Book 3. Kansas City: Andrews McMeel., p. 210 ))

The question of „facts“ does not let go of historiography, history didactics and history teaching. A few years ago it had been the subject of a public controversy about the teaching of history – also and especially in the context of the Hamburg Historians‘ Conference – on which I also commented here in the blog.¹ And, — according to the reports of some participants* on Twitter — it has been raised again at the (still running) „histocamp 2019“ in Berlin.

Finally, it was also the subject of the 2018 issue of the Zeitschrift für Geschichtsdidaktik, which I edited, where it was contrasted with „fictions“. Since I did not elaborate on it the necessary form and clarity in my introduction, I would like to argue here that both the concept of „facts“ and the opposition to „fictions“ are part of the problem, but not part of the solution (the repetition of this question already points to the problem). So what is the problem?

There is much truth in the quotation given as the motto of this article – as much about the function of history (orientation) as about the desire to simply „know“ and „convey“ things (events).

Exactly this latter need is what caters to the idea of „facts“ as given entities only to be taken note of and considered as the basis for all efforts of higher historical thought processes. Even if the concept of historical knowledge — contrary to some ideas in the broader public — cannot be reduced to it (procedural knowledge about procedures of gaining knowledge, conceptual and also metacognitive knowledge are widely acknowledged), the idea of „knowledge“ of facts as the basis, the starting material of historical thinking and the gaining of historical insights is still often part of it. The article quoted in the controversy quoted at the beginning „Pupils must learn facts“ by my Berlin colleague Thomas Sandkühler is just one example.

The idea that the availability of such knowledge is a rather low level of historical learning also underlies the widespread taxonomy of learning objectives according to Benjamin Bloom – at least its modelling of the cognitive dimension. This distinguishes in ascending order in the image of a pyramid „knowledge“, „comprehension“, „application“, „analysis“, „synthesis“ and „evaluation“.
Similarly – and perhaps even more sharply – it is formulate in the revised version after Lorin Anderson and David Krathwol, in which the nouns are replaced by verbs indicating operations and where the order is slightly reversed and the last stage is changed: „remember“, „understand“, „apply“, „analyze“, „evaluate“ and „create“.

The idea of progression of learning underlying this gradation is – at least for the domain and discipline of history – highly problematic: US historian and history educator Sam Wineburg recently postulated that historical knowledge cannot be the basis and starting point of historical thought, but rather is to be regarded as its result. He calls for the taxonomy, according to Bloom, to be rotated by 180° in order to turn it from head to toe, so to speak.² In the background of this position stands Wineburg’s well-known position that historical thinking is not something innate to man — an „unnatural act“. Without a process of learning that is quite strenuous, we would be able to understand all the phenomena of the past with the help of the information that is available to us from our present lives – „presentist“, that is.

Not only must we learn abstractly that the past was different, that people had different (and by no means inferior) perspectives, horizons of understanding, and worldviews, but we must (according to Wineburg) laboriously train ourselves to assume and recognize this otherness in dealing with questions of the past and materials from the past. This also applies to the identification of what was the case. „Knowledge“ about the past with regard to its actuality is thus the supreme result of historical thought – but by no means an easy prerequisite.³ By the way, this also fits in perfectly with a statement of the German colleague Karl Ernst Jeismann, according to which value judgements („evaluation“) are by no means at the end, but at the beginning of many historical thought processes – at least in the form of relevance decisions, which set the preoccupation with the past and its meaning in motion.⁴

I myself consider Wineburg’s criticism of the taxonomy of Bloom or Anderson/Krathwol to be justified, but his solution its 180° rotation is not a solution, for it overlooks the fact that „knowledge“ or „remembering“ – like most abilities and activities – never exist only in a quality or elaboration stage. It would also be wrong to locate knowledge only at the end of long learning processes. This applies equally to the operations of application, synthesis, evaluation – and of course also to understanding. For all these operations apply, however, that they not only occur in simple everyday forms as well as in highly elaborated studies by experts and researchers, but are explicitly addressed.

Keeping in line with Wineburg’s pictorial metaphor, I therefore suggest that the taxonomies not be rotated by 180° but rather by 90° and that their pyramid form be dissolved. This would yield a set of „columns“ for the individual abilities and operations, which then can be differentiated individually as to the quality of the operation resp. ability described. „Learning“, then, is not to be understood as the progress from one operation to the next after the first one has been „completed“, but as a process of elaboration both of the individual operations or abilities and their respective connections.⁵

But then „facts“ are neither simply prerequisites nor the sole final goal of historical thought and learning processes. Rather, they are mental summaries of facets of past life, action, suffering and being at different levels of abstraction and reflection for the purpose of naming and communicating them and including them in further argumentation. They are neither a prerequisite nor a result, but complexes of knowledge, distinctions and assignments of meaning gained in a (historical) thinking and judgement – and as such they are both a result and a prerequisite of historical thinking. But with that they are not simply „given“, but require reflection and understanding again and again. This is especially so because the demarcation of such „facets“ of the past from others is by no means predetermined, for the „differentiation of things as they were and of things as we see them“ is, with Peter von Moos, „from the outset ‚an empty gesture‘, because we are exclusively confronted with a selection of linguistically composed memorabilia (or ‚facts‘) from myriads of events, filtered by interpretation and to be interpreted“.⁶. What can be isolated as a „fact“ is not only a question of the accuracy of historical work, but also a question of perspective, of questioning, of interest, of the ability to distinguish (so to speak the „glasses“), which is shaped by the horizon of perception and perception.

Not only must we learn abstractly that the past was different, that people had different (and by no means inferior) perspectives, horizons of understanding, and worldviews, but we must (according to Wineburg) laboriously train ourselves to assume and recognize this otherness in dealing with questions of the past and materials from the past. This also applies to the identification of what was the case. „Knowledge“ about the past with regard to its actuality is thus the supreme result of historical thought – but by no means an easy prerequisite.³ By the way, this also fits in perfectly with a statement of the German colleague Karl-Ernst Jeismann, according to which value judgements („evaluation“) are by no means at the end, but at the beginning of many historical thought processes – at least in the form of relevance decisions, which set the preoccupation with the past and its meaning in motion.

I consider Wineburg’s criticism of the taxonomy of Bloom or Anderson/Krathwol to be justified, but his solution its 180° rotation is not a solution, for it overlooks the fact that „knowledge“ or „remembering“ – like most abilities and activities – never exist in one quality or elaboration stage only. It would also be wrong to locate knowledge only at the end of long learning processes. This applies equally to the operations of application, synthesis, evaluation – and of course also to understanding. For all these operations apply, however, that they not only occur in simple everyday forms as well as in highly elaborated studies by experts and researchers, but are explicitly addressed.
The taxonomies must rather (if one already follows Wineburg’s pictorial solution) not be rotated by 180°, but by 90° and their pyramid form dissolved, so that several „columns“ for the individual abilities and operations arise, which can be „stepped“ individually in each case. „Learning“ is then not to be understood as the progress from one operation to the next after the first one has been „completed“, but as a process of elaboration both of the individual operations or abilities and their respective connections.⁷

But then „facts“ are neither simply prerequisites nor the sole final goal of historical thought and learning processes. Rather, they are mental summaries of facets of past life, action, suffering and being at different levels of abstraction and reflection for the purpose of naming and communicating them and including them in further argumentation. They are neither a prerequisite nor a result, but complexes of knowledge, distinctions and assignments of meaning gained in a (historical) thinking and judgement — and as such they are both a result and a prerequisite of historical thinking. But with that they are not simply „given“, but require reflection and understanding again and again. This is especially so because the demarcation of such „facets“ of the past from others is by no means predetermined, for the „differentiation of things as they were and of things as we see them“ is, with Peter von Moos, „from the outset ‚an empty gesture‘, because we are exclusively confronted with a selection of linguistically composed memorabilia (or ‚facts‘) from myriads of events, filtered by interpretation and to be interpreted“.⁸. What can be isolated as a „fact“ is not only a question of the accuracy of historical work, but also a question of perspective, of questioning, of interest, of the ability to distinguish (so to speak the „glasses“), which is shaped by the horizon of perception.
Does this now lead to a relativism? Not at all, – or at the most with regard to the aspect of delimitation and identification of the „facts“ mentioned last, but not with regard to their actuality. Whoever rejects the concept of „facts“ by no means asserts arbitrariness and by no means necessarily speaks for (free) fiction, even if all names of facts and events always adhere to conjectural parts due to the particularity of tradition, selectivity and perspective. The problem with the „facts“ does not consist in their factuality, but in their presumed and maintained character as given units, which as such one can know and know, without considering the perspectivity and the interest that led to their differentiation. „Auschwitz“ (to take a very clear example) is not a „fact“. This sentence does not deny that there has been Auschwitz, but it recognizes that (1.) the term „Auschwitz“ designates more than a neutral, clearly delimitable and also not further decomposable unit of the past, which only in retrospect gains reference to and meaning for others. No, what we call „Auschwitz“ is gradually different for the people who suffered and were murdered there, for the survivors and their descendants who also suffered, but also for the perpetrators and their descendants, and finally for us today. There is not one Auschwitz, there were and there are many. But this does not mean that they had nothing to do with each other, that they existed separately, or even that Auschwitz was „only“ constructions.

What is at stake here, however, is not whether „Auschwitz“ is „a fact“, but rather the facticity of the events and experiences specifically described by the term „Auschwitz“. This is very well documented (in the vast majority of cases). The opposite of speaking of the „fact of Auschwitz“ is therefore not the assertion of its fictionality. Not „fact“ or „fiction“ is the correct opposition, but „presupposed fact“ or „insight into the past and its facticity gained by thinking“. Both, the respective concrete delimitation and summary as well as their property of „factuality“ can be gained in the mode of historical thinking, are the results of such thought processes. Otherwise „fake news“ and lies could not be identified and separated. The „memories“ of „Benjamin Wilkomirski“ (actually Bruno Dösseker) and the „Auschwitz“ figuring therein (only „identified“ outside the book), for example, could and had to be denied factuality, without this also applying to Auschwitz as a whole.

The fact that both the identification and delimitation of the respective event or occurrence and its factuality are results of thought processes does not prevent them from being addressed as facts in communication about the past and history. To let such „facts“ learn as „as such“ and to „convey“ them to schoolgirls as a prerequisite for interpretation and interpretation undermines the development of the competences that are necessary to be able to exist critically thinking in the diverse and problematic historical culture.

Not only order and sense („order and direction“), but also the „knowledgeability“ of events (and, add: circumstances)⁹ are thus result, but not condition of historical thinking – and should also figure as such in historical learning processes. And if it were not for the slightly ironic-fatalistic tone of Calvin’s wisdom (which serves him in the comic to want to write a „revisionist“ biography of himself), much of the quote would be quite seriously worth considering. One would, however, have to replace the terms „fiction“ and „invent“ not by their opposites („facts“ and „find out“), but by „narratives“ and „create“ — or even „construct“. „Stories are the narratives we construct to convince ourselves that we know something [about the past] that offers us order and orientation in our lives.“

That is what is meant by historical thinking being „contingency management“ („Kontingenzbewältigung“). The concept of „contingency“ here describes far more than „coincidence“. It refers to the uncertainty that arises between the two beliefs (a) that everything in the world and in life is clearly predetermined, and (b) that there are no connections between details of life whatsoever (both within and across times).
The first conviction would make historical thinking unnecessary, because we ourselves would have to judge ourselves as completely determined and thus without any possibility of decision, without any freedom of attention, perception, judgement and decision. „Orientation“ would not only be useless – we would not even come up with the idea of searching for it. The latter position in turn (complete coincidence) would have to lead us into an absolute aporia, because strictly speaking we could not expect anything with any degree of certainty. The fact that we also always have a connection of some kind between phenomena, circumstances and occurrences in life, even beyond time, is thus an essential element of contingency (con-tingere, lat.: to touch, to transfer), but also that this connection is not simply given and recognizable, but offers comprehensive (albeit not infinite) degrees of freedom. It is this area of contingency between presupposed, but not unquestionably and unambiguously determinable meaning of the past for the present and the future, for our expectations and plans, that makes historical thinking necessary – and with it „knowledge“ about the past, which, however, is not simply given. Knowledge of „facts“ can also be opened up historically thinking, in the form of conclusions about the factuality of details, namely, as such about synchronous and diachronic connections and, finally, also as conclusions and evaluations about significance and meanings for our own and all present and future.

What consequences could be drawn for history education and history lessons in schools? Does it mean that no more „facts“ are allowed to appear in teaching units and lessons, that it were no longer permissible or acceptable to no longer present facts (structures) and occurrences (events, event sequences, actions, etc.) in teacher lectures, timelines and tables, author texts in books, etc. — to make them available to students as material for their work? Not at all! Such references are not only instruments of school learning, but also part of social communication about history. And depending on the concrete question and task, it is not only helpful but also necessary to make them available to pupils or to let them work them out themselves. However, this does not mean that these occurrences and structures should not or even must not come into the focus of reflective, differentiating and evaluative thinking in the course of working with them. QUite to the contrary: it is almost part of the task of historical learning not only to consider, but also to examine and, if necessary, reformulate, differentiate or reject statements and assertions made in the materials (especially those in primary sources and accounts from different perspectives).

And more: The understanding of „facts“ (if one does not want to drop the term completely) not as givens, but as references to facets of history, „provisionally“ being formulated within the course of thought, research and communication not only renders it possible to differentiate and to interpret them, but also to compare culturally and linguistically different forms not only of their designation and interpretation, but also of their definition. This enables the explicit thematization and reflection of such different terms as „Seven Years‘ War“, „French and Indian War“, „3rd Silesian War“, „Great War for the Empire“, „Guerre de la Conquête“ and „Third Carnatic War“ as terms both for different, but also (more or less) connected events and – even more – for the political, cultural and temporal perspectives inherent in such terms (some of these terms only being possible retrospect). It is also possible to explicitly discuss designations in Simple and Easy Language with regard to their power (for the development of the facts and the participation in the learning processes and interpretations) and limitations, and the need for further explanations and additions.

The consequence of the problematization of the concept of „facts“ due to its possible connotation (especially in the case of learners) of them being – so to speak – „upstream“ of historical thinking and learning and thus also partially detracted from it, and from the alternative focus on „factuality“ as the actually intended and relevant characteristic, is, therefore, not relativism, but rather the necessary facilitation at all times of the thematization and reflection both of the constitution of the individual „facts“ and of their qualification as „factual“. The latter operations are represented by the concept of validity („Triftigkeit“) or plausibility, above all in empirical terms¹⁰, which renders it possible – in an elementaryized, or more precisely: graduated form – for students to arrive at their own conclusions on the factuality of asserted events. Finally, the focus on factuality instead of on „facts“ also opens up the construction of a learning progression in the recording and reflection of these dimensions of historical thought and historical communication that can be taught and learned „step by step“ so to speak.